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Abstract
This paper discusses, ﬁrst, the properties of scientiﬁc and technological
knowledge and the institutions supporting its generation and its economic
applications. The evidence continues to support the broad interpretation
which we call the ”Stanford-Yale-Sussex” synthesis. Second, such patterns
bear important implications with respect to the so-called ”European Para-
dox”, i.e. the conjecture that EU countries play a leading global role in
terms of top-level scientiﬁc output, but lag behind in the ability of con-
verting this strength into wealth-generating innovations. Some descriptive
evidence shows that, contrary to the ”paradox” conjecture, European weak-
nesses reside both in its system of scientiﬁc research and in a relatively weak
industry. The ﬁnal part of the work suggests a few normative implications:
much less emphasis should be put on various types of ”networking” and
much more on policy measures aimed to both strengthen ”frontier” research
and strengthen European corporate actors.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D80, O33, O38.
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11 Introduction
We originally began this work simply meaning to address what is known as the
”European Paradox”. Such a paradox — which sounds quite similar to an earlier
”UK paradox”, fashionable around thirty years ago — refers to the conjecture
that EU countries play a leading global role in terms of top-level scientiﬁc output,
but lag behind in the ability of converting this strength into wealth-generating
innovations. However, we soon realized, ﬁrst, that the paradox mostly appears
just in the ﬂourishing business of reporting to and by the European Commission
itself rather than in the data. Second, both the identiﬁcation of the purported
paradox, and the many proposed recipes suited to eliminate it, happen to be
loaded with several, often questionable, assumptions regarding the relationship
between scientiﬁc and technological knowledge, and between both of them and the
search and production activities of business enterprises.
Hence we decided to move a couple of steps backward and start by making
explicit where we stand in the long-lasting controversy on the nature and prop-
erties of scientiﬁc and technological knowledge and on the institutions supporting
its generation (section 2). The proposed framework, we suggest, ﬁts quite well
with a series of robust ”stylized facts”, notwithstanding the multiple criticism re-
cently undergone by the institutional setup which grew in the West over more
than a century ago and fully developed after World War II (sections 3 and 4).
Having spelled out the interpretative tools, we turn to the evidence supporting
the existence of a ”European paradox” (or a lack of it) (section 5) and discuss
the European comparative performance in terms of scientiﬁc output, proxies for
technological innovation, and actual production and export in those lines of busi-
2ness which draw more directly on scientiﬁc advances. Indeed, one does not ﬁnd
much of a paradox. Certainly one observes signiﬁcant diﬀerences across scientiﬁc
and technological ﬁelds, but the notion of an overall ”European excellence” ﬁnds
little support. At the same time one does ﬁnd ample evidence of a widespread
European corporate weakness, notwithstanding major success stories.
The interpretation bears also far reaching normative implications (section 6
and section 7 ). If we are right, much less emphasis should be put on various
types of ”networking”, ”interactions with the local environment”, ”attention to
user need” — current obsessions of European policy makers — and much more on
policy measures aimed to both strengthen ”frontier” research and, at the opposite
end, strengthen European corporate actors.
2 Science and technology: some interpretative
yardsticks
One has written extensively elsewhere on the subject (Dosi, 1982, 1988; Dosi et al.,
2004). Here, suﬃces to sketch out what one could call the Stanford-Yale-Sussex
(SYS) synthesis, sure to displease almost everyone, as a shorthand for the con-
ﬂuence between works on the economics of information (including Arrow (1962);
Nelson (1959); David (1993, 2004)) and works focussing on the speciﬁc features
of technological knowledge (including Freeman (1982, 1994); Freeman and Soete
(1997); Nelson and Winter (1982); Nelson (1959); Pavitt (1987, 1999); Rosenberg
(1976, 1982); Winter (1982, 1987); and also Dosi (1982, 1988)). In such a synthesis,
ﬁrst, one fully acknowledges some common features of information and knowledge
3— in general, and with reference to scientiﬁc and technological knowledge, in par-
ticular. Moreover, second, one distinguishes the speciﬁc features of technological
knowledge and the ways it is generated and exploited in contemporary economies.
As to the former point, both information and knowledge share the following
properties
• Some general features of public goods: (i) non-rival access (i.e. the fact
that one holds an idea does not constrain others from holding it to); (ii) low
marginal cost of reproduction and distribution, which in principle makes it
diﬃcult to exclude others from having access to newly generated information
(except for legal devices such as copyrights and patents), as compared to
high ﬁxed costs of original production [The latter point applies primarily to
information, stricto sensu].
• A fundamental uncertainty concerning the mapping between whatever one
expects from search activities and their outcomes.
• (Relatedly) serendipity in the ultimate economic and social impact of search
itself (Nelson, 2004a).
• Quite often, very long lags between original discoveries and ”useful” appli-
cations.
However, scientiﬁc and even more so technological knowledge share, to diﬀer-
ent extent some degrees of tacitness. This applies to the pre-existing knowledge
leading to any discovery and also to the knowledge required to interpret and apply
whatever codiﬁed information is generated. As Pavitt (2001) puts it with regards
to technological knowledge
4• ”most technology is speciﬁc, complex ...cumulative in its development”.
”Speciﬁcity” applies in two senses: ”It is speciﬁc to ﬁrms where most tech-
nological activity is carried out, and it is speciﬁc to products and processes,
since most of the expenditures is not on research, but on development and
production engineering, after which knowledge is also accumulated through
experience in production and use on what has come to be known as ”learning
by doing” and ”learning by using”” (Pavitt, 1987) (p.9).
• Moreover ”the combination of activities reﬂects the essentially pragmatic na-
ture of most technological knowledge. Although a useful input, theory is rarely
suﬃciently robust to predict the performance of a technological artefact under
operating conditions and with a high enough degree of certainty, to eliminate
costly and time-consuming construction and testing of prototype and pilot
plant”(Pavitt, 1987)(p.9).
A distinct issue regards the relations between scientiﬁc knowledge, technolog-
ical innovation, and their economic exploitation. In this respect, note that the
SYS synthesis is far form claiming any linear relation going from the former to
the latter. On the contrary many contributors to the SYS view have been in the
forefront in arguing that the relationships go both ways (see Freeman (1982, 1994);
Rosenberg (1982); Kline and Rosenberg (1986); Pavitt (1999), among others).
In particular one has shown that, ﬁrst, technological innovations have some-
times preceded science in that practical inventions came about before the scientiﬁc
understanding of why they worked (the engine is a good case for the point).
Second, it is quite common that scientiﬁc advances have been made possible
by technological ones especially in the ﬁelds of instruments (e.g. think of the
5importance of the microscope).
Third, one typically observes complementarities between science and technol-
ogy, which however ”varies considerably amongst sectors of application, in terms
of the direct usefulness of academic research results, and of the relative importance
attached to such results and to training” (Pavitt, 1987)(p.7).
Having said that, it is also the case that since the Industrial Revolution, the
relative contribution of science to technology has been increasing and its impact
has become more and more pervasive, while the rates of innovation have often
been shaped by the strength of the science base from which they draw (Nelson,
1993; Mowery and Nelson, 1999). In turn, ”this science base largely is the product
of publicly funded research and the knowledge produced by that research is largely
open and available for potential innovations to use. That is, the market part of the
Capitalist Engine [of technological progress] rests on a publicly supported scientiﬁc
commons”. (Nelson, 2004a)(p.455).
Together, the fundamental vision underlying and supporting such a view of
publicly supported open science throughout a good part of the 20th century en-
tailed (i) a sociology of the scientists community largely relying on self-governance
and peer evaluation, (ii) a shared culture of scientists emphasizing the importance
of motivational factors other than economic ones and (iii) an ethos of disclosure
of search results driven by ”winner takes all” precedence rules1.
So far so good. However, both the factual implications of the SYS synthesis
and the normative implications of the Open Science institutional arrangements
have been recently under attack from diﬀerent quarters.
1On those points following the classic statements in Bush (1945); Polanyi (1962) and Merton
(1973), see the more recent appraisals in Dasgupta and David (1994); David (2004); Nelson
(2004a) and the conﬂicting views in Geuna et al. (2003).
63 The Open Science system under threat
It is worth to start asking the question why the institutional set-up governing the
generation of scientiﬁc knowledge and the relations between science, technology
and industry has been put into question despite the fact that it has worked remark-
ably well through most of the 20th century. [More detailed analyses from diﬀerent
angles, which we largely share, can be found in David (1997), Nelson (2004a), and
Pavitt (2001)]. In that, note that the challenges to the ”Open Science” institutions
often have come confusingly folded together with plenty of remarks regarding the
two-ways interactions between science and technology, oﬀering the misleading im-
pression that lack of smooth ﬂows between science and its applications would bear
any direct consequence in terms of the publicity of scientiﬁc results themselves.
Here are, telegraphically, what we consider major drivers and byproducts of
the critique of the ”open science” system.
First, as Pavitt (2001) succinctly puts it, the consensus to the institutional
arrangement supporting publicly funded open basic science, in primis in the US,
has been a sort of ”social pact” catalyzed by the ”fear of communism and cancer”.
Nowadays, half of the reasons have disappeared, substituted by ”terrorism”, which
however can hardly play the same role. Indeed in Guantanamo times it is diﬃcult
to imagine ”universalist” missions linking scientiﬁc research and political objectives
akin those of the anti-communist era.
Second, the critique of the ”linear model”, the one, to repeat, naively suggest-
ing unidirectional ”trickle down” ﬂows from science to technology to proﬁt-driven
production activities, has gone far too far. It has done so with the help of plenty
of economists who did ﬁnally take on board some of the ”economics of informa-
7tion” ﬁndings (cf. above all the pioneering works of Nelson (1959) and Arrow
(1962)), while totally neglecting at the same time the diﬀerences between sheer
information and technological knowledge, mentioned earlier. The result has been
a widespread notion of ”plasticity” of both scientiﬁc and technological search to
economic incentives. Sure, if information bears public good features, than ”mar-
ket failure” problems are bound to arise. But whenever the incentive structure
can be ﬁxed — this story goes — then knowledge production should properly re-
spond to incentives much alike the production of steel or automobiles. Together
the fundamental speciﬁcities stemming from the very nature of the scientiﬁc and
technological problem-solving activities disappear. ”Incentives” can ﬁx anything,
from the cure to cancer to the proof of the last Fermat theorem, as easy as one
can elicit a variation in any ordinary production. [On the contrary view which we
largely share, cf. Nelson (2003); see also a critical review of parts of the discussion
on technology and problem-solving in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (2004)].
If one lets this dangerous stuﬀ available in the hands of religious believers,
one indeed gets an explosive mixture. An archetypical case is Kealy (1996) —
properly reviewed by David (1997) —, disciple of the economist inspired zeitgeist
on the ”magic of market place” — as Ronald Reagan used to say —, and of the
miracles of property rights. David (1997) warns us about how a ”market ideology”
in conducive times may easily become a ”scholarly” reference for all those who are
just eager to believe it, irrespectively of the soundness of the underlying evidence.
And indeed our times seem particularly favorable to the spread of such ideologies.
Another point of attack against Open Science has been the extension of the
Property Right System to the institutions generating scientiﬁc knowledge (in
primis, universities) and the expansion of the domain of patentability.
8Regarding the former, the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) in the US is considered a land-
mark, allowing (indeed encouraging) universities to take out patents on their (pub-
licly funded) research results. Similar legislation is nowadays common throughout
the world.
Concerning the domains of patentability, one has seen a progressive extension of
what is patentable which has now come to include living entities, genes, algorithms,
data banks, and even ”business models” (!?). These institutional changes have
been implicitly or explicitly supported by the idea that ”more property rights
are generally better” in that they cure the ”market failure” associated with the
public-nature characteristics of scientiﬁc knowledge (as if it were a problem!!). An
outcome has been that ”important areas of science are now much more under
the sway of market mechanisms than used to be the case. And in particular, in
some important ﬁelds of science important bodies of scientiﬁc understanding and
technique now are private property rather than part of the commons” (Nelson,
2004a)(p.462).
The last challenge to the Open Science System — and to a signiﬁcant extent
also to the SYS synthesis — has come from quite distinct quarters, which could
come under the heading of the ”social constructivism/deconstructivism” perspec-
tive. The current is made of multiple streams which however share some similar
notion of ”plasticity” of science and technology, this time under the pressure of
social forces and ”political negotiation”.
There is little doubt on the importance of the social shaping of technology,
as MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) put it (see also Rip et al. (1995)). However
important controversies concern (i) the bounds which the nature of speciﬁc tech-
nical problems and of speciﬁc bodies of knowledge put upon the reach of ”battling
9competing interests and more or less eﬀective campaigns to capture the hearts and
minds of (diﬀerent constituencies)” (Nelson, 2004b) (p.514), and (ii) the degrees
of ”social determinism” driving technological and scientiﬁc change. And indeed
many versions of ”social constructivism” depart a long way from the SYS synthe-
sis: pushing it to a caricature, sometimes one has the impression that with good
bargaining skills even gravitation and thermodynamics laws may be renegotiate
with nature!
Finally, on the institutional side it is suggested that the modes of organization
of scientiﬁc and technological search — centered on universities, corporate labo-
ratories, relatively structured disciplinary ﬁelds, peer review of the outcomes of
scientiﬁc search, etc. — has been progressively replaced by what Gibbons et al.
(1994) call ”Mode 2 of knowledge production”. In brief, as summarized by Martin
(2003), such a mode involves ”multi-or trans-disciplinary research carried out in
a growing variety of institutions and with a blurring of the boundaries between
the traditional sectors (university, industry, and so on...) and also between science
and society...[and] knowledge is increasingly being produced ”in the context of ap-
plication [...] with societal needs having a direct inﬂuence from the early stage
and with relatively explicit social accountability for the funding received by the
government” (Martin, 2003)(p. 12-13).
4 Some Persistent ’Stylized Facts’
The empirical grounds for such a statement are of course crucial for the entire
”revisionist” story to hold.
Consider the following pieces of evidence partly drawn from Pavitt (2001) and
10Pavitt (2003).
1. Contrary to the claim that scientiﬁc and technological knowledge can be
increasingly reduced to sheer ”information”, the distinction between the two
continues to be highly relevant. A good deal of knowledge is and is likely
to continue to be rather ”sticky”, organization- and people-embodied and
often also spatially clustered. Related to this is the persistence of widespread
agglomeration phenomena driven by top level research (see Jaﬀe et al. (1993)
among many others and Breschi and Lissoni (2001) for a critical review).
2. Useful academic research is good academic research. ”Systematic evidence
from the US shows that the academic research that corporate practitioners
ﬁnd most useful is publicly funded, performed in research universities, pub-
lished in prestigious referred journals” (Pavitt, 2001)(p.90) and frequently
cited by academic themselves (on these points see Narin et al. (1997) and
Hicks et al. (2000)).
3. Government funding of basic research is responsible, especially in the US,
for most major scientiﬁc advances, including in the ﬁelds od information
sciences and bio-sciences (Pavitt (2001) and the references cited therein).
4. The proportion of university research that is business ﬁnanced is very low
everywhere (typically less than 10%) and lower in the US than in Europe
(see Table 7 and the discussion below).
5. The expansion of US university patenting has resulted in a rapid decline of
the patent quality and value (Henderson et al., 1998)).
116. Increases in licensing income in leading US universities are concentrated in
biotech and software, and have preceded the Bayh-Dole act. · Moreover,
income ﬂows from licensing are quite small as compared to the overall uni-
versity budget: in most cases they are unable to cover even the administrative
costs of the ”technology transfer oﬃce” in charge of them!
· At the same time still anecdotal evidence begin to hints at the ways the
new appropriation regimes for public research tends to corrupt the ethos of
researchers and twist their research agendas and in the US even
”[s]ome of the nations largest and most technology-intensive ﬁrms are begin-
ning to worry aloud that increased industrial support for research is disrupting,
distorting, and damaging the underlying educational and research missions of
the university, retarding advances in basic science that underlie these ﬁrms
longterm future” (Florida, 1999). [On many of the foregoing points see also
Nelson (2004a)].
7. Interestingly, only very rarely a critique of the Open Science System and
public funding of basic research has come from corporate users, except for
peripheral countries and peripheral entrepreneurs — such as e.g. Italian
ones — hoping to transform universities in sorts of free training subsidiaries.
On the contrary, notably, ”in the UK, where critical rhetoric is among the
strongest, it comes mainly from government sources... In the US, companies
like IBM have complained recently about the potentially armful eﬀects on
future competitiveness of reduction in public support to academic research
in the physical sciences” (Pavitt, 1999) (p.90). At the same time there is an
increasing perception also among business ﬁrms that ”too much appropri-
ability” hurts also ﬁrms themselves. In fact, as noted by Florida (1999),
12”[l]arge ﬁrms are most upset that even though they fund research up front, uni-
versities and their lawyers are forcing them into unfavorable negotiations over
intellectual property when something of value emerges. Angered executives at
a number of companies are taking the position that they will not fund research
at universities that are too aggressive on intellectual property issues.... One
corporate vice president for industrial R&D recently summed up the sentiment
of large companies, saying, ”The university takes this money, then guts the
relationship”. [But also] [s]maller companies are concerned about the time de-
lays in getting research results, which occur because of protracted negotiations
by university technology-transfer oﬃces or attorneys over intellectual property
rights. The deliberations slow the process of getting new technology to highly
competitive markets, where success rests on commercializing innovations and
products as soon as possible”.
More generally, both upstream researchers and downstream product devel-
opers begin to perceive what Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have called the
anticommons tragedy: the excessive fragmentation of Intellectual Property
Rights among too many owners can slow down research activities and prod-
uct development because all owners can block each other.
With this general background in mind, broadly supporting the SYS interpreta-
tion and the continuing eﬀectiveness of Open Science institutional arrangements,
let us turn to the comparative assessment of the mechanisms of generation and
economic exploitation of scientiﬁc and technological knowledge in the EU.
135 In search of the purported ”European Para-
dox”
The central point of the ”paradox” is the claim that the EU scientiﬁc performance
is ”excellent” compared with its principal competitors, while Europe’s major weak-
ness lies in its diﬃculties in transforming the results of research into innovations
and competitive advantages.
One of the ﬁrst oﬃcial documents that popularized the ”paradox” was the
Green Paper on Innovation (EC, 1995). The two pieces of evidence provided
therein in support of it, and thereafter too often taken for granted, were, ﬁrst,
the (slightly) higher number of EU publications per euro spent in non-business
enterprise R&D (nonBERD) and, second, the lower number of granted patents per
euro spent in BERD vis-` a-vis the US and Japan. Those phenomena, as important
as they can be, do not shed much light on the substance of the ”paradox” and, as a
matter of fact, even the European Commission seems to admit in its Third Report
on Science and Technology Indicators (EC, 2003) that the ”paradox is vanishing”2.
What does indeed the overall evidence tell us? In what follows, we shall illus-
trate some of the strengths and weaknesses of European Science and Technology
(S&T) system, arguing that the paradox is nowhere to be seen.
First, let us brieﬂy consider the claim on ”scientiﬁc excellence”.
2One of the documents published by the Commission that present the results has a revealing
title: ”From the ’European Paradox’ to declining competitiveness”.
14The pieces of evidence and myths on the European scientiﬁc leadership
A central part of the ”Paradox” regards the width, depth and originality of Euro-
pean Science. Discerning wether the the data support the claims of a purported
European leadership3 is not a trivial task. Bibliometric analysis oﬀers important
insights, but also presents drawback and biases. To begin with, the main source of
data, the Thomson ISI dataset, is itself a business activity of the Thomson Corpo-
ration responding to economic incentives. For example, the decision on weather to
include a given journal, is focussed more on libraries (which have to decide which
journal is worth buying) than on scientiﬁc reasons as such4. Second, comparing
citation across disciplines is likely to be misleading, given diﬀerent citation inten-
sities (e.g. papers in medical research are much more cited than mathematical
ones). Nevertheless, bearing in mind such limitations, measuring the Scientiﬁc
Impact of Nations continues to be a revealing exercise. And indeed, as we show
below, the picture that emerges from data on publications and citations is far from
pinpointing a European leadership in science.
Advocates of the ”paradox” notion have emphasized that, during the second
half of the nineties, Europe has overtaken the US in the total number of published
research papers. However, the latter indicator needs to be adjusted by a scaling
factor due to sheer size: otherwise one could claim that Italian science base is
better than Swiss one given the higher total number of papers published! The ﬁrst
column of Table 1 shows that, if one adjusts for population, European claimed
3A view, again voicefully endorsed by most of the EU Commission: so, the chapter of the
Third Report devoted to measure the European performance in knowledge production is titled
”Scientiﬁc output and impact: Europe’s leading role in world science”(EC, 2003).
4Eugene Garﬁeld, founder and stock holder of the ISI, suggests indeed to use the Impact
Factor based on ISI citations mainly to evaluate journals themselves, but not individuals or
single works (Garﬁeld, 1996). Straightforward unweighted citations may yield less of a bias.
15leadership in publication disappears5.
Moreover, in science, together with the numbers of publications, at least equally
important, are the originality and the impact of scientiﬁc output upon the relevant
research communities. Two among the most used proxies of such an impact are
articles’ citations6 and the shares in the top 1% most cited publications.
As shown in Table 1, the US is well ahead with respect to both indicators. In
particular, controlling for population, the outstanding EU output is still less than
half than the US one.
In the second and third column of the same table, we decompose the output
(i.e. number of publications, citations, and top 1% publications) per population
indicator, into two components: a measure of scientiﬁc productivity of university
researchers (i.e. output per university researcher) and a an index for the intensity of
university researchers on population. The table clearly shows that US leadership
is due to the quality of research published rather than on the sheer number of
researchers.
Similar results are obtained from another measure of research performance
based on individuals citations in distinct scientiﬁc ﬁelds. King (2004) reports that
considering 14 scientiﬁc ﬁelds
”Of the top 1,222 scientists [...] 815, or 66%, are from the United States and
only 251 from the sum of the United Kingdom (100), Germany (62), France (29),
Switzerland (26), Sweden (17) and Italy (17)” (p.315).
5Certainly normalization by population is a very rough proxy which also averages across
very diﬀerent entities, ranging from Sweden, Germany and the UK all the way to Italy, Greece
and Portugal (just sticking to EU-15). However also the US average over Massachusetts and
California but also Mississippi and Idaho.
6Typically, they are very skewed: only a few publications are highly cited, while the over-
whelming majority of articles receives zero citations.






US 4.64 6.80 0.68
EU-15 3.60 4.30 0.84
UK 5.84 6.99 0.84
Germany 3.88 4.77 0.81
France 3.96 4.09 0.97





US 39.75 58.33 0.68
EU-15 23.03 27.52 0.84
UK 42.60 51.00 0.84
Germany 26.82 32.98 0.81
France 25.81 26.68 0.97






US 0.09 0.13 0.68
EU-15 0.04 0.04 0.84
UK 0.08 0.10 0.84
Germany 0.05 0.06 0.81
France 0.04 0.05 0.97
Italy 0.03 0.06 0.44
Notes: Our calculations based on numbers reported by King (2004) and OECD (2004a). Number of publications, citations and
top 1% publications refers to 1997-2001. Population (measured in thousands) and number of university researchers (measured in
full time equivalent) refer to 1999.
17Figure 1: Most cited authors
 
Analogously, Figure 1, based on a recent Royal Society report, shows that the
overwhelming majority of the most highly cited authors in ten disciplines have US
aﬃliations (Royal Society, 2004).
In line with the above is the evidence concerning Nobel Prize winners displayed
in Figure 2. After the Second World War the gap between US and EU has been
growing at an impressive rate.
Of course, despite the variety of ways of categorizing scientiﬁc disciplines,
there is a high inter-disciplinary variation in the revealed quality of European
research. Following EC (2003)(p.287), consider eleven subﬁelds (Agriculture and
Food, Clinical Medicine and Health, Physics and Astronomy, Basic Life Science,
Chemistry, Mathematics and Statistics, Biology, Earth and Environment, Com-
puter, Biomedicine and Pharmacology, and Engineering) and compare a composite
index which takes into account the number of publication, number of citations and
18Figure 2: Nr. of Nobel Prizes in chemistry, physics, medicine or physi-






relative citation impact score. Then, one ﬁnds that NAFTA (US plus Canada and
Mexico) compared to EU-15, performs better in clinical medicine, biomedicine,
and does especially well in chemistry and the basic life sciences. Using a diﬀerent
and more aggregate classiﬁcation and comparing citations shares, King (2004) also
ﬁnds US superiority in life and medical sciences, while Europe performs slightly
better in physical sciences and engineering (see Figure 3). Incidentally, a few im-
portant distinctive patterns within the EU also emerge: for example France is
strong in math, while Germany and UK do relatively well in physical and life
science respectively7.
Figure 4 focuses on the citation patterns in one of the knowledge drivers of the
ICT revolution, namely computer sciences. Regrettably, the EU performance is
on average rather disappointing.
7See King (2004) for further details on this point.
19Figure 3: Strengths in diﬀerent disciplines
             
Notes: Plot shows research footprints based on the shares of citations. The distance from the origin is citation share. See King
(2004) for sources (ISI Thompson) and details.
20Figure 4: Citation impact in Computer Sciences (1993-199)
 
 
The general message from bibliometric data is therefore far from suggesting
any generalized European leadership. On the contrary, one observes a structural
lag in top level science vis-` a-vis the US, together with some average catching
up and a few sectoral outliers in physical sciences and engineering and few single
institutional outliers (such as Cambridge also in computer science and several other
disciplines: but outliers are precisely outliers).
The ﬁrst fact on which the paradox conjecture should be based is simply not
there. Rather a mayor EU challenge regards how to catch up with the US in
scientiﬁc excellence.
21Poorer technological performances: R&D inputs and innovative outputs
of the EU
In order to explore in detail the European performance in technology and inno-
vation, one also needs to match European investments in science and technology
(i.e. inputs typically proxied by education and R&D expenditures) with outputs
(typically proxied by patents).
First, as shown in Figure 5, at aggregate levels the EU underinvests in R&D
with respect with both US and Japan and, notwithstanding wide variation within
EU itself (as showed by Figure 6), the gap is not shrinking.
Second, the usual claim concerning the higher share of government funded
R&D in the EU as compared to the US is simply groundless8. On the contrary if
one compares the shares of government ﬁnanced R&D on GDP (Figure 7), EU is
still lagging behind.
Third, the gap is much wider in business enterprise R&D (BERD) expendi-
tures (see Figure 8). Again, despite diverse countries patterns, there is no sign of
catching up (Figure 9).
Fourth, important factors in explaining the above asymmetries are the wide
and persistent diﬀerences in the eﬀorts devoted to knowledge production and ab-
sorbtion across industrial sectors. Table 2 shows that, if one measures the latter
with R&D sectoral intensities, industries diﬀer a lot. This in turn is partly due
to inter-sectoral diﬀerences in technological opportunities and partly in the way
the latter are tapped — which in some industries involves formal R&D activities
8The misunderstanding is usually based being on the use of the share of publicly funded R&D
on total R&D expenditures, which does not carry much economic sense. The meaningful ﬁgures
regard normalizations with the economic size of the economy.
22Figure 5: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D as (%) of GDP
 




Figure 7: Government ﬁnanced R&D as a % of GDP, 1999
 
 
24Figure 8: Business enterprise expenditure R&D (BERD) as a % of GDP,
2000 or latest available year
 
 





25Table 2: R&D Intensities across industries: BERD as % of value added
B DK GER SPA FR I A FIN SVE UK EU-7 US JAP
Tot. Manufacturing 6.4 5.7 7.5 2.1 7. 2.2 4.6 8.3 11.3 5.4 5.7 7.8 8.4
Food, Bev. & Tob. 1.6 1.4 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.4 na 2.8 1.0 1.2 0.8 na 1.9
Tex., apparel & leather 2.0 0.8 2.1 0.6 0.9 0.1 na 2.2 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 2.1
Paper & Print. 0.9 na 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.3 na na 0.4 na na
Pharmaceutical 25 40 na 10.1 27.6 na 15.1 na 46.5 48 na 23.3 19.0
Non-electrical Mach. 6.6 6.6 5.8 2.9 4.6 1.4 4.4 9.0 11.1 4.8 4.6 4.7 5.7
Comp. & Oﬃce Mach. 12.3 18 17 7.5 13.3 7 3.7 na 39.5 3.5 14.1 22 na
Electrical Mach. 7.6 8 3.4 3.3 7.7 na 5.7 na 18.2 7.8 4.5 12 17.6
Electronic Mach. 32.7 13.5 39.6 19.1 34.1 na 28.5 28.1 38.6 12.1 32.7 na 23.6
Instruments 11.3 15.3 11.9 3.7 16.9 2.2 6.8 22.5 18.5 7.3 11.5 32.6 23.8
Motor Vehicles 4.0 na 18.3 2.6 13.1 10.4 10.1 3.6 28.9 9.2 14.3 16 13.2
Aerospace 6.5 na na 25 40.1 na na na na 24.3 na 30.9 0.6
Notes: EU-7: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and Finland. Electrical Machinery does not include data for
Italy and Finland. Electrical Equipment does not include data for Italy. Paper and Printing and Aerospace do not include data
for Denmark.
Source: DG Research (EC, 2003).
and in others more informal processes of learning-by-doing, learning-by-using and
learning-by-interacting with suppliers and customers9. It happens that Europe is
largely penalized by a composition eﬀect, in that it is relatively strong in technolo-
gies (such as mechanical engineering) wherein a good deal of search is not recorded
under the ”R&D” heading. Moreover, even pairwise sectoral comparisons with the
US sometimes reveals a European gap. So, for instance US R&D investments are
well above European ones in ”Oﬃce, Accounting & Computing Machinery”, ”Elec-
trical Machinery” and ”Instruments” industries, while similar levels are observed
in ”Motor Vehicle” and ”Non-Electrical Machinery”.
Finally, note that if one considers the world top 500 corporate R&D perform-
ers, research investments in a selected number of sectors suggest that the EU gap
is prominent precisely in those activities which are the core of the current ”tech-
9Within an enormous literature, on these points see Dosi (1988); Klevorick et al. (1995);
Nelson (1993); Lundvall (1992); Malerba (2004).




nological revolution”, namely ICT and Pharmaceuticals (see Figure 10 and EC
(2003) (p.143) for details). Of course, this can be due to both sectoral and cor-
porate heterogeneity, but the general message is that Europe invests less in those
key sectors.
Consistently with the above evidence, one observes also a lower ratio of ”knowl-
edge workers” in the total workforce in Europe as compared with the US: cf. Ta-
ble 3 depicting the percentage of tertiary level graduates and researchers on the
labor force10.
Complementary to proxies for the intensities of innovative search eﬀorts and
for the skills of workforce involved, patent-based indicators are generally used to
shed light on the Technological Output of Nations. Needless to say, institutional
diﬀerences, distinct corporate appropriability strategies, and diﬀerent propensity
10This data should be taken however with some care, given the uneven state of secondary
education across diﬀerent countries.
27Table 3: Shares of knowledge workers on total workforce
Tertiary-level graduates % Researchers per 1000 labor force
EU-15 24 5.36
US 36 8.66
Source: OECD (2003) and EC (2003).
Table 4: Shares in ”triadic” patent families
1994 1996 1998 2000
EU-25 34 32 33 32
US 35 37 35 35
Source: OECD (2004a).
to patent across sectors may bias the international comparisons. Moreover, these
indicators are generally constructed on the basis of patent applications issued by
national patent oﬃces having an ”home advantage” bias. However, the OECD has
developed ”patent families” (i.e. patent ﬁled in diﬀerent countries to protect the
same invention) that try to mitigate this latter bias and generally capture patents
of relatively high economic value11. In Table 4 we report EU-25 and US shares
in ”triadic” patent families (i.e. inventions ﬁled with the European Patent Oﬃce
(EPO), the Japanese Patent Oﬃce (JPO), and the US Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (USPTO)). Shares are relatively stable with a slight European decline.
Again, EU performance varies signiﬁcantly in distinct technology ﬁelds. The
upper part of Table 5 depicts the shares of US and EU patents ﬁled at the Euro-
pean patent oﬃce in ﬁve main ﬁelds. It shows that, having as benchmark the All
11See Dernis et al. (2001) for details.
28Table 5: Shares of patents ﬁled with EPO for diﬀerent ﬁeds
Electricity Instruments Chemistry Processes Mechanics All Fields
EU-15 36.3 36.5 37.5 50 54.1 42.6
US 35.2 39.7 39.9 27.1 22.1 33.1
Telecom IT Semiconductor Pharma Biotech Materials
EU-15 37.9 26.9 29.2 35.7 28.3 55.1
US 35.7 49.3 36.2 43.5 51.3 19
Source: EC (2003).
Fields column, EU has relative strengths in Processes and Mechanics and, con-
versely, major weaknesses in Electricity/Electronics, Instruments, and Chemistry.
At a more disaggregated level, the lower part of the same table, which focuses
on six selected subﬁeld whose technological dynamism has been particularly high,
suggests that in Information Technologies, Pharmaceutical and Biotech the US is
well ahead, while Europe has comparable shares of patents in Telecommunication
and does particularly well in Materials, especially due to the Germany score.
To sum up, R&D expenditures and patent based indicators pinpoint a European
lag in terms of both lower search investments and lower innovative output. This is
largely the eﬀect of the weaknesses in technological ﬁelds that are considered as the
engine of the contemporary ”knowledge economy”. On the other hand, data show
a few points of strength in more traditional technologies related to mechanical
technologies and new materials.
29Structural weaknesses of European corporations and science-industry
interaction
The third angle to explore the paradox conjecture concerns the limits and weak-
nesses that European business enterprises display in innovating and competing
in the world economy. The evidence, in our view, suggests that a fundamental
factor underlying the worsening performance of European ﬁrms are their lower
commitments to research and international patenting and, in several sectors, their
relatively weak participation to the core international oligopolies, quite apart from
any immagined weaknesses in the industry-university links.
Let us focus in particular on those industries where the consequences of Euro-
pean lags in science and technological innovation are likely to be more severe.
Figure 11 shows the production shares in several ICT sectors. If the overall
rankings of EU-15, US and Japan have remained more or less stable, variations
in individual shares shows that EU lost the lead even in the telecommunications
industry, where in the nineties it had a big advantage. Europe has also declined
relative to the United States in oﬃce equipment. On the other hand, in radio
communications and radar equipment the United States has somewhat lessened
its lead relative to Europe (in turn, this has probably been the outcome of the
formation of few European companies especially in the military sector with sizes
and capabilities at least comparable with the American counterpart).
A less straightforward, but still rather dismal, picture comes from the data
measuring performance in trade in mayor high tech sectors. Table 6 depicts ex-
port market shares of large EU countries12 and the US in 1996, 1999, and 2002.
12Data on EU total would have required to exclude trade within EU countries.
30Figure 11: Share of World ICT Production
 
31While in aerospace US has lost some ground and EU has grown, the opposite has
happened in Instruments (Interestingly the European gains in aerospace, mainly
due to Airbus has implied a more even distribution of exports between France, the
UK and Germany with a relative loss of France itself). In the remaining sectors
shares are relatively stable with the exception of Germany’s losses in pharmaceu-
tical.
Combining diﬀerent sources, the last OECD Information Technology Outlook
(OECD, 2004b) explores the performance of the top 250 ICT ﬁrms and the top 10
ones in four subsectors (communication equipment and systems, electronics and
components, IT equipment and systems, IT services, software and telecommuni-
cations). It turns out that 139 of the top 250 ﬁrms (56%) are based in the United
States and only 33 (13%) in the EU, conﬁrming an overall weak EU amongst the
world industrial leaders, notwithstanding subsectoral exceptions. So, six EU ﬁrms
appear in the top 10 of telecommunication services ﬁrms, three in the top 10 of
communications equipment and systems ﬁrms, two in the top 10 of electronics and
components ﬁrms, and only one in the top 10 of software ones. Finally, there are
no European ﬁrms among the 10 larger ﬁrms in IT equipment and systems.
These data support indeed the conjecture that, quite independently of the
”bridges” between scientiﬁc research and industrial applications, potential corpo-
rate recipient are smaller weaker and less receptive than transatlantic counterparts.
This is well highlighted also by those revealing cases where science is world top
class, all the ”transfer mechanisms” are in place but hardly any European ﬁrm is
there to beneﬁt. A striking examples of this are computer science at Cambridge,
England: an excellent scientiﬁc output is most exploited by non-European ﬁrms
(from Fujitsu to Microsoft and many others).




France 16.71 14.26 13.55
Germany 10.71 12.67 13.73
Italy 2.70 2.38 2.95
UK 12.87 11.85 17.09
US 41.02 43.60 36.37
Japan 1.39 1.76 1.35
Electronic
France 5.18 5.43 4.77
Germany 7.84 7.34 8.75
Italy 2.42 1.83 1.92
UK 7.72 6.72 8.52
US 19.24 23.69 20.95
Japan 25.33 18.76 17.64
Oﬃce Machinery and Computers
France 5.68 4.85 3.65
Germany 6.98 6.84 8.09
Italy 2.80 1.64 1.27
UK 10.83 10.29 8.59
US 22.96 27.07 20.22
Japan 20.29 15.69 13.08
Pharmaceutical
France 9.89 10.55 9.60
Germany 14.84 15.13 10.84
Italy 6.17 5.73 5.68
UK 11.42 9.98 9.17
US 10.63 11.98 10.52
Japan 3.53 3.03 2.28
Instruments
France 5.64 5.15 5.35
Germany 15.05 14.11 14.55
Italy 4.17 3.34 3.44
UK 7.42 6.85 6.60
US 22.87 25.84 25.33
Japan 16.74 14.90 13.54
Notes: Our calculations based on OECD (2004a). ISIC revision 3: Aerospace industry (353); Electronic industry ISIC (32); Oﬃce
machinery and computer industry (30); pharmaceutical industry (2423); medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
clocks (instruments) industry (33).










Note that the presumed feeble links between science and industry should be
one of the most important aspect of the paradox conjecture. Surprisingly, the
evidence here is simply non-existent. Curiously the Third Report does not address
the issue explicitly, but just discusses the ”science content” of EU technology,
which is a rather distinct issue (EC, 2003) (p.422). Concerning the latter, the
number of citations to scientiﬁc journal articles in patents that cite science is
indeed higher in the US, but the hypothesis that this reﬂects the EU weaknesses
in Science-Industry interaction is a questionable one. Rather, it might primarily
reveal the diﬀerent composition of European technological output, with patterns
of specialization which tend to be less ”science based”.
Another often cited evidence concerning the ”paradox” conjecture is the low
revealed productivity of European University and research centers, usually mea-
34sured by patent propensity. However, a few case studies have shown that the
technology outputs of European public research laboratories are higher than usu-
ally believed if one considers relevant institutional diﬀerences. For instance, once
we take into account the whole number of patents ﬁled by European researchers
and not just those that are directly owned by the research institutions where they
are employed, the inter-atlantic diﬀerences across comparable institutions are not
so big (Figure 12)13.
The few indicators available which may be considered more direct measures
of the interaction between business and higher education pinpoint to conclusions
opposite to the conventional wisdom. As Table 7 shows the share of private in-
vestment in higher education R&D, while low everywhere, is marginally higher in
EU than in the US and much higher than Japan. Similar results are obtained if
one considers the private sectors annual investment in the public research sector
(i.e. the sum of higher education and government R&D) and King (2004) (p.314)
reports that in the last years a few EU counties experienced larger growth.
6 From the wrong diagnosis to misguided poli-
cies
To sum up, certainly the European picture is variegated with respect to the gen-
eration of both scientiﬁc knowledge and technological innovation. However, no
overall ”European paradox” with a leading science but weak ”downstream” links
is there to be seen. On the contrary it seems to us that signiﬁcant weaknesses
13See Azagra-Caro et al. (2005); Balconi et al. (2002); Llerena (2004); Meyer (2003); Saragossi
et al. (2003); Wallmark (1997) for more details on national and European pieces of evidence.
35Table 7: Shares of Higher education Expenditure on R&D (HERD) ﬁ-
















EU - 15 6.8
US 6.3
Japan 2.3
Notes: Austria 1993, Ireland 1998, US 2000. EU-15 calculated by DG research, Luxembourg not included.
Source: EC (2003).
36reside precisely at the two extreme with, ﬁrst, a European system of scientiﬁc
research lagging behind the US in several areas and, second, a relatively weak
European industry. The latter, we have argued, is characterized on average by
comparatively lower presence in the sectors based on new technological paradigms
— such as ICT and biotechnologies —, a lower propensity to innovate and a rel-
atively weak participation to the international oligopolies in many activities. In
turn, such a picture as we shall argue below, calls for strong science policies and
industrial policies. However, this is almost the opposite of what have happened.
The belief into a purported paradox together with the emphasis on ”usefulness”
of research has led to a package of policies where EU support to basic research is
basically non-existent. ”Research proposals are expected to identify possible prac-
tical as well as scientiﬁc beneﬁts; higher priority is being given to user involvement
(including partial funding), universities are being invited to extract more revenue
from licensing their intellectual properly, and substantial public funds have been
spent on ”foresight” exercises designed to create exchange and consensus around
future opportunities of applications” (Pavitt, 2001) (p.768).
The ”Frame Programmes” have all being conceived with such a philosophy,
which in the most recent one is pushed to the extreme with the ”Networks of
Excellence”: not only they do not support research but they explicit prohibit the
use of EU money for that purpose!!
Similarly, with regards to industrial R&D, the focus on ”pre-competitive” re-
search has meant the emergence of a sort of limbo wherein ﬁrms — often in combi-
nation with academics — try to tap community money in areas that are marginal
enough to not justify the investment of their own funds. Moreover, the networking
frenzy has gone hand in hand with the growth in number and power of research
37bureaucrats (both at European and National level) whose main competence is
precisely in ”networking”, ”steering”, writing lengthy reports and demanding re-
searchers to do the same. Here again the extreme is in social sciences. A bit
like the old Soviet Union where even papers in mathematics had to begin with
”according to the clever intuition of comrade Breznev...”, in many areas one has
to begin each research proposal by arguing that what follows is crucial in order to
foster fashionable keywords such as ”cohesion”, ”enlargement”, ”citizenship”, etc.
even if in fact the real scientiﬁc interest goes to, say, the econometrics of panel
data or the transmissions mechanisms of monetary shocks... And with all this goes
yet another type of corruption of the ethos of the researchers who have to develop
the skills of camouﬂage and peddling...
If our diagnosis is correct, this state of aﬀairs is bad for the research, wasteful
for society and also bad for business.
7 A conclusion with some modest proposals which
might help both Science and Business
Some general implications of the analysis above are the following.
First, increase support to high quality basic science, through agile institutions
much alike the American National Science Foundation (NSF) relying on world-
class peer-review and also physically located far away from Brussels — as May
(2004) suggests!
In that direction the constitution of a European Science Council is a welcome
development14.
14See also the arguments recently put forward by a communication of the European Commis-
38Second, fully acknowledge the diﬀerence within the higher education system be-
tween (i) research-cum-graduate teaching universities, (ii) undergraduate teaching
universities and liberal art college, and, (iii) technical colleges.
The well placed emphasis of the role of the ﬁrst type of institutions comes
often under the heading of ”Humbold model” as pioneered by Germany more than
a century ago. However, nowadays the practice is most American, while Europe
(especially Continental Europe) often oﬀers in most universities a confused bland
of the functions which is neither good for research nor for mass-level training.
Third, push back the boundaries between public open research and appropriable
one.
One often forget that appropriability is socially justiﬁed only in so far it is an
incentive to innovation itself. As we have argued above, appropriation of the out-
put of public research does not perform that role. Of course this applies primarily
to basic research while the picture is much more blurred for practically oriented
disciplines such as engineering and a lot of pragmatism is required. However we
would stand by the general point that too much of an emphasis on appropriability
and IPR is likely to exert a pernicious inﬂuence on both the rates and directions
of search. Moreover, we suggested above, it might also represent a signiﬁcant
hinderance to business-led innovation.
Our lag in the institutional changes leading to a much more property-based
system of research as compared to the US for once might play in our favor in that
it might be easier for us to stop and reverse the tendency (for a through discussion
of the forgoing appropriability-related points, see Nelson (2004a).
Fourth, build ambitious, technological daring missions justiﬁable for their in-
sion, which appears to hint at a promising break with respect to previous policies (EC, 2004).
39trinsic social and political value.
As Pavitt (2001) reminds us ”Scandinavian countries and Switzerland are able
to mobilize considerable resources for high quality basic research without the mas-
sive defense and health expenditures of the world’s only superpower” (p.276).
Hence, he suggests, also the larger European countries and the European Union
itself, have more to learn from them than from the USA” (p.776).
Granted that, however, one should not rule out the importance of large scale
far-reaching European programs with ambitious and technologically challenging
objectives in the ﬁelds of e.g. energy conservation, health care, environmental
protection (and perhaps also the European re-armament, although there is not
much agreement on it even among the authors of this work!).
Fifth, re-discover the use of industrial policies as a device to foster a stronger,
more innovative, European industry.
We are fully aware that nowadays ”industrial policy” is a bad word which
cannot be mentioned in a respectable company without being accused supporting
Jurassic-era ”national-champions”, distorting competition, fostering production
patterns which go against ”revealed” comparative advantages, etc. We are tempted
to answer ”why not”?! Certainly the period — until the late seventies / early
eighties — characterized by discretionary intervention of policy makers on the
very structure of various industries has been characterized by many failures but
also several successes. For instance, the European strength in telecommunications,
the presence in semiconductors, the growing competitiveness in aircrafts, etc. are
also the outcomes of the policy measures of the ”interventionist” era. Today,
even within the constraints of the new trade arrangements, much more, we think,
can be done in order to strengthen the European presence in the most promising
40technological paradigms, were it not for a self-inﬂicted market worship (yet another
commodity largely exported by the US, but consumed there quite parsimoniously
and pragmatically!).
We are well aware that these modest proposals might be accused of conser-
vatism. However, for once we do not mind at all be in the camp of those who
try to defend and strengthen a system producing top level publicly funded open
science — too often under threat by both the ”property right” colonization and
the ”practical usefulness” advocates —, and, together, a pragmatic view of the
role that public policies might have in fostering the growth of corporate actors
able to eﬃciently tap an ever-growing pool of innovative opportunities.
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